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Drawing on high reliability theory, this study investigates how a firm’s information security (InfoSec) 
practices as practical proficiencies form its organisational security culture. We tested the model using 
survey data from 602 professional managers in Australia and New Zealand who are aware of the 
InfoSec programmes within their respective organisations, the findings of which suggest a security 
culture is influenced by a firm’s practical proficiencies in the form of InfoSec practices namely 
prevention, detection and response practices. Our findings also emphasise the importance of 
organisational supportive proficiencies as organisational structure for improving the impact of InfoSec 
preventive practices on organisational security culture in a firm. The results of this study provide both 
academics and practitioners an understanding of the vital organisational dynamics necessary to 
establish a culture of security. 
Keywords Information security practices, security culture, high reliability theory 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems                                                              Hassandoust & Johnston 
2020, Wellington  Information Security Practices 
  2 
 
1 Introduction  
The security culture of an organisation encompasses the values and beliefs of the firm that direct the 
security-related behaviours and assumptions of its employees (Van Niekerk and Von Solms 2010). It is 
the security culture that reflects both the espoused values and shared tacit assumptions of an 
organisation as it pertains to security events and both collective and individual responses to those 
events. When new threats emerge that are not readily addressed in policy, the organisation’s security 
culture may help direct the activities of the employees to produce security outcomes that go above and 
beyond what is actually prescribed in policy. For instance, in the event that a novel social engineering 
attack is administered against an organisation, how the organisation will respond to this threat is 
influenced by its security culture. 
For many organisations, however, such a culture doesn’t exist, or is under-developed, leaving the firm 
relatively vulnerable to any number of external and internal threats, errors, or mishaps (Da Veiga and 
Eloff 2010). Under-developed security cultures can leave a firm less secure, scrambling for guidance 
and assumptions for security responses in the event of a security incident. In such cases, socio-cultural 
norms within the organisation are either inactive or ineffective, and how employees communicate and 
respond to others and to formal and informal organisational forces is unpredictable and unreliable. 
Moreover, under-developed security cultures leave organisations without the necessary framework for 
self-inspection, reflection, and consequently, and the opportunity to improve upon its mistakes 
(Ruighaver et al. 2007). Toward assisting these exposed firms, both academics and practitioners have 
focused considerable energy on exploring the factors and metrics that are essential to an effective, 
lasting security culture (Da Veiga and Eloff 2010; Martins and Elofe 2002; Van Niekerk and Von 
Solms 2010). Yet, despite these efforts, it is still not clear how security cultures are formed and what 
the key drivers of them are.  
In this study, we focus on the practical and supportive proficiencies of an organisation that direct its 
employee behaviours and establish the norms of the organisation. In this context, we refer to a firm’s 
practical proficiencies as its information security (InfoSec) practices. These are the set of procedures 
designed to: protect organisational information assets and information systems (IS) (Ahmad et al. 
2014); detect any potential security attack (Hamill et al. 2005); react to InfoSec incidents (Baskerville 
et al. 2014); or take some actions to reduce caused losses (Lu et al. 2017). The supportive proficiencies 
of a firm are its functional and intellectual arrangements that facilitate its security practices. For most 
organisations, these proficiencies emerge organically as the organisations engage in the activities that 
provide value to their stakeholders and position them competitively within their industries (Da Veiga 
and Martins 2015; Dhillon et al. 2016; Martins and Elofe 2002), but in terms of their impact on a 
security culture, their emergence is anything but organic and their value is far less understood. For this 
reason, we ask, what are the key practice and supportive proficiencies of an organisation that are most 
influential in forming a culture of security and how is this influence formed? 
To answer these questions, we can turn to an organisational theory focused on the firm-level 
proficiencies that lead to the development of cultural outcomes, High Reliability Theory (HRT). HRT 
associates an organisation’s culture with high reliability in that for a culture to take shape, reliable 
outcomes must come from the assumptions, norms, and decision making practices that occur within 
the organisation over time (Boin and Schulman 2008). We believe similar patterns of reliable 
outcomes are also associated with security cultures. This study is part of a larger project with a mixed, 
multi-study research design. In the current study, we develop and test a model that explains a security 
culture as a product of an organisation’s key practical and supportive proficiencies. 
This research manuscript unfolds as follows. First, we present a review of the literature concerning 
security culture. We then describe HRT and its appropriateness for this study. We then propose a set 
of hypotheses and test the model. We then conclude with a discussion of its implications to research 
and practice. 
2 Literature Review  
2.1 Security Culture 
HRT Security culture as an organisational sub-culture with a specific purpose of InfoSec, entails an 
understanding and awareness of InfoSec issues and policies (Chen et al. 2015; Pfleeger et al. 2015). 
The aims and objectives of a security culture should be aligned with formal business processes and 
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organisational culture (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001) and should include all socio-cultural 
countermeasures that support technical security measures (Chen et al. 2015). Further, cultivating an 
security-aware culture mitigates the privacy and security risks to information assets and IS within 
organisations (Da Veiga and Eloff 2010; Nel and Drevin 2019).  
Organisations are mainly equipped with technical controls and countermeasures in place, while in 
order to mitigate InfoSec risks, organisations must emphasise creating and growing a security-aware 
culture that accounts for the various range of potential InfoSec threats (Nel and Drevin 2019; O'Brien 
et al. 2013). InfoSec protection should be a natural part of employees’ daily tasks; that is, InfoSec 
should be integrated into the corporate culture and employees’ InfoSec behaviours in the workplace 
(Thomson et al. 2006).  
Security culture has been investigated from several aspects, such as defining the culture (e.g., Furnell 
and Thomson 2009; Van Niekerk and Von Solms 2010), the principles and frameworks on which a 
security culture could be based (e.g.,Da Veiga and Martins 2015; Martins and Elofe 2002; Ruighaver et 
al. 2007; Zakaria and Gani 2003), and their organisational cultural and behavioural levels (e.g., Da 
Veiga and Eloff 2010; Martins and Elofe 2002). Drawing on a security culture framework, previous 
researchers have explored a number of factors that influence security cultures, such as the role of chief 
information security officers, top management support, education and training, monitoring and 
enforcement, and security policies (e.g., Ashenden and Sasse 2013; Chen et al. 2015; Da Veiga 2018; 
Da Veiga and Eloff 2010; Da Veiga and Martins 2015). However, very few of these studies have focused 
on the key proficiencies of an organisation that facilitate its culture of security. Moreover, there is a 
lack of theoretical foundations to support the process of establishing a security culture.  
2.2 InfoSec Practices 
There are a number of broadly recognised InfoSec management frameworks available to instruct 
organisations in planning and operating their InfoSec practices such as ISO (Tittle et al. 1986) 
standards and COBIT (Brand and Boonen 2007) that prescribe formal, technical and InfoSec 
countermeasures (Åhlfeldt et al. 2007). Most of these InfoSec frameworks are universal in scope with 
quality control principles such as Plan-Do-Check-Act. Such quality control principles have proven 
valuable for routine InfoSec activities that support historical comparisons (Baskerville et al. 2014). 
Sophisticated InfoSec management approaches design controls based on risk analysis and concentrate 
on preventing the continuation of known InfoSec threats (Baskerville 1988). However, the prevention-
oriented frameworks (reliability and exploitation) with their predefined control sets might be less ideal 
in today’s dynamic InfoSec threat environment (Baskerville et al. 2014). In this environment, 
organisations face the need to detect new InfoSec threats and new forms of attacks (Antunes et al. 
2010). Therefore, organisations require a more response-oriented InfoSec philosophy (validity and 
exploration) in addition to the existing preventive frameworks. 
Organisational InfoSec practices are a set of procedures and activities designed to protect the integrity, 
availability and confidentiality of organisational information assets that include IS (Burns 2019). 
InfoSec practices can be categorized into four classes based on their intent, namely detection, 
prevention, response and mitigation (Lu et al. 2017; Lu et al. 2019). Prevention is the most commonly 
used InfoSec strategy to proactively protect information assets from being breached or exploited 
(Ahmad et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2001). Prevention strategies are developed to be activated before an 
InfoSec breach happens (Lu et al. 2017). Prevention practices can be implemented to avoid 
information leakage. Examples include a periodic clean desk practice for sensitive documents (Ahmad 
et al. 2014), encrypting information flowing over networks to prevent leakage and using firewalls to 
filter network traffic (Zalenski 2002). Detection practices are designed to be utilized before or 
sometimes during an InfoSec breach (Lu et al. 2017). For effectiveness, the detection of an attack and 
subsequent reporting to the InfoSec managers must be timely (Hamill et al. 2005). This reported 
information should be actionable such as based on whether an attack has begun, when the attack 
began, and what is the scope of the attack (Henauer 2003; Stytz 2004). 
Response practices are intended to react to InfoSec incidents that either have occurred or are 
happening (Baskerville et al. 2014). Response practices include appropriate corrective actions against 
identified attacks and short-term responses such as mobilizing equipment to respond to the 
emergency and bringing necessary systems and services back online (Ahmad et al. 2014; Speier et al. 
2011). The response stage can be divided into two phases: the reaction phase, where appropriate 
actions are taken against the attack, and the recovery phase, where the situation is restored to its 
original state (Hamill et al. 2005; Saydjari 2004). Mitigation is a set of preplanned practices aimed at 
reducing losses by lessening the impact of InfoSec breaches (Sheffi 2005). Mitigation practices boost 
the ability of organisations to recover before severe and enduring effects materialize (Lu et al. 2017). In 
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an endeavor to mitigate the detrimental effects and ease the painful consequences of an InfoSec 
breach, organisations may take various approaches such as cross-training employees in InfoSec 
measures to enable even unskilled employees to perform these measures.  
2.3 Organisational Structure 
An organisational structure is defined as “ the formal allocation of work roles and the administrative 
mechanisms to control and integrate work activities, including those that cross formal organisational 
boundaries” (Child 1984 p. 2). The importance of organisational structures has been discussed for a 
long period of time. For example, Child has argued the essential role of organisational structure in 
designing an effective organisation (Child 1984). Organisational structure assigns human and 
technical resources to the activities that need to be done and the supportive mechanisms for their 
coordination (Rocha Flores et al. 2014). Further, organisational structure determines and facilitates 
operational and strategic decision making and monitors the performance and operating mechanisms 
that transfer instructions on what is expected of organisational employees and how the instructions 
should be followed (Child 1984). 
Organisational structure plays a key role in making an InfoSec governance plan successful (Von Solms 
and Von Solms 2004). In an InfoSec context, organisational structure is defined as the organisation of 
InfoSec functions (Kraemer and Carayon 2007) and refers to the formal and informal structures that 
expresses the organisational hierarchy. As such, it involves the processes that combine people into 
workgroups and establishes who does what and how to communicate to get the tasks completed 
(Warkentin and Johnston 2008). Kayworth and Whitten (Kayworth and Whitten 2010) classified 
organisational structure as either a formal organisational structure or a coordinating structure (see 
Figure 1). Formal organisational structure refers to the formalized structures that are implemented to 
support the management of InfoSec matters within an organisation (Rocha Flores et al. 2014).  
According to (Kayworth and Whitten 2010), formal organisational structures may include having a 
formal InfoSec unit within the organisation whose mission is to secure the organisation’s information 
assets. The purpose of this unit is to develop and implement the organisation’s standards and practices 
governing organisation-wide InfoSec. Coordinating organisational structures refer to formal and 
informal meetings among a group of people responsible for InfoSec tasks and representatives from 
various business units in the organisation to facilitate the communication of strategic business plans 
between business and InfoSec functions (Kayworth and Whitten 2010; Rocha Flores et al. 2014).  
3 Theoretical Background 
To understand how a firm’s practical and supportive proficiencies have a controlling influence over its 
culture of security, we first need to understand how security cultures are formed and the factors that 
are important to their presence. Given the importance of sustained focus and repeated success to the 
development and sustenance of a culture, we believe HRT provides an appropriate lens for developing 
this understanding. 
3.1 High Reliability Theory 
HRT concentrates on the processes that an organisation can implement to ensure continued 
organisational reliability and mitigate or even eliminate the possibility of incidents (Roberts 1990a; 
Roberts 1990b). Although these processes and strategies are not always completely developed or 
entirely implemented in organisations, taken together, these strategies suggest the elements of a 
complete system for preventing catastrophes (Morone and Woodhouse 1986; Perrow 1994). HRT 
demands safety, and there are two strategies for achieving safety: anticipation that entails efforts to 
predict and prevent possible incidents from occurring before they have ever happened; and resilience, 
efforts to deal with incidents once they become manifest (Perrow 1994; Wildavsky 1988).  
There are four critical causal factors for achieving high reliability in organisations (Perrow 1994; Sagan 
1995): 1) top managers put safety and reliability first as a goal; 2) setting up high levels of redundancy 
in personnel and technical safety measures; 3) developing a ‘high reliability culture’ in decentralised 
and continually practiced operations; and 4) advanced types of trial and error organisational learning. 
Organisational culture is part of high reliability process, as it establishes a homogenous set of 
assumptions, norms, and decision premises. When these are invoked on local and decentralised bases, 
compliance happens without surveillance (Weick 1987). 
Much of HRT research has focused on specific organisations that could potentially experience a major 
failure with substantial consequences but have shown themselves to be highly reliable despite their 
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high risk environment (e.g., aircraft carriers, air traffic control, and nuclear power plants) (e.g., Porte 
and Consolini 1998; Roberts et al. 1994) as a result of a deliberate process by which risks are 
monitored, evaluated, and mitigated (Perrow 1994). These organisations show an immense capacity to 
react to and learn from such incidents, avoid disabling, and to restructure their procedures to mitigate 
future incidents and avoid major failures (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). There is a growing body of 
literature describing the complementary nature of HRT from an integration of organisational practice 
perspective with a focus on the protection mechanisms that organisations can put in place to best react 
to organisational (security) disruption (Rijpma 1997).  
HRT has developed robust research streams across business, sociology, healthcare, and other 
disciplines (e.g., Boin and Schulman 2008; Sagan 1995; Wolf 2005). While HRT has not been widely 
applied in InfoSec research, its focus on organisational reliability creates a meaningful lens to assess 
InfoSec practices within organisations. InfoSec practices can be implemented to assure continued 
organisational reliability (Speier et al. 2011). Having protective and responsive strategies, practices, 
and personnel in place can enable the organisations to respond more effectively (Lu et al. 2017). HRT 
has implications for intentional events as illustrated by changes in IS and InfoSec systems. For 
example, computer hackers have become highly sophisticated in their ability to transmit increasingly 
elaborate InfoSec threats. Therefore, computer software programs and organisations’ security 
procedures should be designed in a way that prevents these intentional actions that can compromise 
confidential information. 
4 Research Model and Hypothesis Development 
We establish an initial research model and hypotheses that reflect HRT in the context of an 
organisational security culture, as shown in Figure 1. Because HRT focuses on processes that result in 
highly reliable outcomes, it helps explain the practical and supportive proficiencies that lead to the 
organisational mechanisms that produce reliable outcomes, such as a security culture.  
 
Figure 1: Proposed research model 
In this conceptual model security culture is presented as an outcome of InfoSec practices, namely 
prevention, detection, response, and mitigation practices. These are practical proficiencies of an 
organisation. Detection and prevention practices share the primary task of thwarting breaches while 
response and mitigation practices are more related to buttressing recovery when a disruption occurs 
(Lu et al. 2017). Prevention practices operate until the moment a security incident happens, following 
which a response takes place (Baskerville et al. 2014). Detection is an operational-level practice that 
aims in identifying specific InfoSec behaviour such as intrusion and misuse behaviours (Hamill et al. 
2005). Response practices are designed to take effect during or after an InfoSec breach has happened 
(Lu et al. 2017). Attacks are sophisticated and generally difficult to evaluate in advance. Thus, 
countermeasure practices should be agile and designed for unexpected and unpredictable risks by 
promptly adopting customized safeguards (Baskerville et al. 2014). Mitigation practices are designed 
to be activated before an InfoSec breach occurs (Lu et al. 2017). If or when an organisation suffers a 
crisis, further measures include developing alternative material sources as back-up processes, focusing 
on resilience, reconsidering the IS design and maintaining redundancy (Lu et al. 2017).  
According to HRT, if common InfoSec controls and practices are correctly implemented, they are able 
to reduce security risks (Barton et al. 2016) and assure organisational reliability (Speier et al. 2011). 
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Automated InfoSec prevention practices reduce risk from some InfoSec threats (Barton et al. 2016; 
Friedberg et al. 2015), but employees’ InfoSec compliance increases the effectiveness of non-
automated InfoSec practices (Montesdioca and Maçada 2015; Siponen et al. 2007).  
Based on HRT, in order to maintain reliability and safety, organisations should concentrate on a set of 
practices to mitigate or even prevent potential incidents (Roberts 1990a; Roberts 1990b). Therefore, in 
the InfoSec context, a set of InfoSec practices should be designed and employed to create an 
atmosphere that promotes employees’ positive InfoSec-related attitude and beliefs, leading to InfoSec 
becoming part of the norms and values in an organisation. These practices can be designed with 
different emphases – either to foster organisational capability to discover (i.e., detect and prevent) 
unexpected InfoSec incidents or to nurture organisational capability to manage (i.e., respond and 
mitigate) unexpected InfoSec events. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H1(a-d): Prevention (a), detection (b), response (c), and mitigation (d) practices are positively 
associated with the security culture in an organisation. 
Flexible organisational structures have a rapid tempo for their buildup and maturation stages, as well 
as a bureaucracy for the maintenance and resolution phase which equips the organisation to be able to 
effectively respond to events in their environment (Grabowski and Roberts 1997). Flexible 
organisational structures also empower employees to enact choices that reinforce the organisational 
culture, which in turn,  would change the tempo and nature of organisations in response to internal 
and external events and changes (Grabowski and Roberts 1997). 
As a key supportive proficiency of an organisation, an organisational structure ensures the alignment 
between the organisation’s security practices, functions and business strategies, facilitates the effective 
organisation of its InfoSec function, contributes to its successful implementation and coordination of 
InfoSec plans and practices (Kayworth and Whitten 2010; Rocha Flores et al. 2014), and clarifies 
where its InfoSec compliance monitoring and enforcement should be established (it should not be part 
of the IT department) (Von Solms and Von Solms 2004). In this study, organisational structure is 
manifested through the two forms of structure: 1) a formalised structure which refers to a centralised 
InfoSec function and supports the development and positioning of uniform organisation-wide security 
practices. A formalised structure also supports the handling of InfoSec matters throughout the 
organisation (Rocha Flores et al. 2014) and 2) a coordinating structure which refers to the utilisation 
of a variety of coordinating InfoSec committees and groups that meet to discuss important InfoSec 
issues both formally and informally. With the support of the formal and coordinating structure, the 
InfoSec function gains valuable insights from the business to facilitate strategic decision making and 
security culture is better enforced through this channel. To more thoroughly understand the positive 
impact of organisational structure as a supportive proficiency for the development of a security 
culture, the following hypotheses are postulated: 
H2(a-d): Organisational structure has positively moderated the relationships between InfoSec 
practices of an organisation, namely prevention (a), detection (b), response (c), mitigation 
(d) and the security culture in organisation. 
5 Research Design 
The assessment of the proposed research model was conducted via a survey of 602 AUS and NZ 
security professionals who are aware of their organisational security-related policies, with 
responsibilities across a range of roles and company sizes. The data collection has been conducted 
through the Cint platform, a third-party market research industry. The measurement items on InfoSec 
practices (detection, prevention, response and mitigation) were adopted from Lu and colleagues 
(2017). For organisational structure, we adopted items from Rocha Flores and colleagues (2014). The 
six items measuring security culture were adopted from Chen et al (Chen et al. 2015). A summary of 
the conceptual definition of each construct and related measurement items, is presented in the 
Appendix A. A five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree 
and strongly agree) was used to measure all of these key constructs. All the constructs of the 
measurement model are first-order reflective constructs except organisational structure that 
considered as a formative second-order construct with two reflective first-order factors including 
formal structure and coordinating structure. In terms of organisational roles, 38.7% of participants 
were chief executive officers, 18.1% of participants were a senior manager in the IT or Security 
department, 13.4% were chief information officer or chief information security officer. Almost half of 
the companies (47.9%) were in small size with 1-19 employees, 29.5% of the companies were in 
medium size (20-199 employees), and 22.6% of the companies were in large size (over 200 
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employees). Majority of the companies had been located in Australia (70.7%) and most of them were in 
business for more than five years (64.5%). 
5.1 Measurement Model Assessment 
We used Partial Least Squares – Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) SmartPLS 3.0 software to 
assess the measurement and structural models. PLS-SEM has been adopted as the most common 
approach in quantitative research studies to examine the relationships between variables in human 
information security behaviours (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Rocha Flores et al. 2014; Warkentin et al. 2016) 
and is recommended for testing models that contain formative constructs (Petter et al. 2007).  
To reduce the potential for common method bias (CMB), we followed procedural guideline established 
in the literature (MacKenzie et al. 2011). The implemented procedural and statistical remedies include 
Harman's single factor test (Harman 1976), Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) marker variable test, Full 
collinearity and multicollinearity assessment approaches (Kock 2015; Petter et al. 2007). Overall, the 
results from these techniques support that CMB is not a significant issue for this study. The validity 
and reliability of the measurement model is tested through the evaluation of loadings or correlation 
weights, internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al. 2019). All the 
items reported a loading greater than 0.7. For internal consistency, the values of Cronbach’s alpha and 
Composite Reliability (CR) should be between 0.7 and 0.95. The evaluation of these estimates revealed 
that all of the constructs were within acceptable thresholds. Convergent validity can be tested through 
the evaluation of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values that should be above 0.5 for each 
composite (Hair et al. 2019). The assessment of AVE values indicated that all were above the cut-off 
value of 0.5. The discriminant validity of the constructs was examined by testing the HeteroTrait-
MonoTrait (HTMT) criterion (Hair et al. 2017). For conceptually similar constructs, HTMT values 
greater than 0.9 suggest the lack of discriminant validity between the constructs. The HTMT value 
should be lower than the thresholds of 0.9 (Gold et al. 2001; Teo et al. 2008). HTMTinference yields 
specificity rates of 80% or higher in terms of inter-construct correlations as high as 0.95. In general, 
HTMT.90 and HTMTinference approaches detect discriminant validity issues reliability (Henseler et al. 
2015). In our study, based on the HTMT.90 and HTMTinference criterion, the results show an acceptable 
level of discriminant validity for each pair of constructs.  
5.2 Structural Model Assessment and Hypothesis Testing 
The structural model evaluation includes assessing collinearity among the exogenous constructs, 
checking the significance and relevance of path coefficients, and examining the model’s predictive 
accuracy and relevance model (Hair et al. 2019). To examine collinearity among the constructs, the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each exogenous construct of the model was evaluated. While VIF 
values should not be greater than 5, values less than 3 are seen as ideal values (Hair et al. 2019). The 
assessment of VIF values indicated that all the values were less than 2.37, indicating no cause for 
concern with respect to collinearity issues. To determine the statistical significance of the path 
coefficients, we ran the bootstrapping routine at a 5% significance level with 10000 bootstrapping 
subsamples (Streukens and Leroi-Werelds 2016). To assess the second-order constructs, we followed 
steps for component-based model estimation by creating a new data file with the latent variable scores 
(two-stage approach) (Wright et al. 2012). The two-stage approach assesses the first-order constructs’ 
scores during the first-stage then these scores are used as indicators for the second-order constructs in 
the second-stage (Duarte and Amaro 2018; Hair et al. 2011). The results of the structural model's 
evaluation are shown in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2: Structural model results, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 and ns = non-significant 
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All hypotheses were supported except for three hypotheses: H1d on the positive association between 
mitigation practices and security culture (path coefficient (β) = 0.037, p = 0.531); H2b and H2d, which 
hypothesised positive moderation effects of organisational structure on the relationships between 
detection and mitigation practices, and security culture, were mot supported (β = -0.035, 0.004, p 
<0.05, respectively), were not supported. R2 explains the variance of the endogenous constructs to 
assess the predictive power of the research model (Chin and Dibbern 2010; Duarte and Amaro 2018). 
The InfoSec practices explains 59% of the variances in security culture. Two control variables, 
organisation size and absorptive capacity, were also tested. Absorptive capacity had a positive 
significant relationship with the security culture variables (β = 0.166 p <0.001), indicating that 
organisations readiness to engage in InfoSec activities based on prior knowledge and resources would 
show a greater level of valuing the importance of information security in the organisations. 
Organisation size had no significant relationship with security culture. Moreover, none of the 
hypothesized paths changed their signs or the significance levels of any of the paths. 
6 Discussion and Contributions 
Under-developed security cultures leave organisations without the necessary framework for self-
inspection and reflection. Despite prior academic and practitioners’ attempts, it is still not clear how 
security cultures are formed and what the key drivers of them are. Toward addressing this research 
gap, we leveraged HRT to develop and test a research model that explores how practical efficiencies 
shape security culture in organisations, and the role of supportive proficiencies like organisational 
structure in this process. Test results show that some practical proficiencies namely protection, 
detection and response inform the security culture. Security culture is most influenced by the InfoSec 
prevention practices. This suggests that InfoSec practices, with an emphasis on fostering 
organisational capability to protect information assets from unexpected InfoSec incidents or nurturing 
organisational strategies to be activated before an InfoSec breach happens, have a substantial role in 
helping InfoSec to become part of the norms and values in an organisation. 
The findings of our research also underscore that ensuring the alignment between security functions 
and business strategies facilitates the effective implementation and coordination of protection 
practices. However, it depicts a reverse influence on the response practices. This may indicate that 
more pressure from organisational structure may alleviate the organisations’ agility in the preparation 
for practices that need to be designed for unexpected and unpredictable risks to promote 
organisational security culture. Future research should identify additional practical and supportive 
proficiencies to better explain InfoSec practices in organisations. The findings of our research also 
highlight the difficulties in enforcing InfoSec practices through organisational structure in the 
organisations. This may indicate that although organisational structure plays a critical role in 
implementation of InfoSec practices in the organizations but does not play a significant role in 
improving the detection and mitigation practices alignment with security culture. The fact that 
organisational structure was not found to moderate the relationship between detection and mitigation 
practices and security culture may suggest that organisational structure either do not play a part in 
helping align their detection and response InfoSec practices with its security culture or are simply 
ineffective in doing so. Either way, this is an important outcome in that this form of strategic guidance 
is typically what the literature suggests is expected of top managers. Given the relative lack of InfoSec 
research at the organizational level, our study provides some needed insight that can help academics 
and practitioners to understand how firm-level security-related outcomes are formed due to both 
supportive and practical dynamics. Many previous studies have investigated the behavioural side of 
InfoSec to evaluate which organizational, and managerial factors influence effective InfoSec 
management practices. While individual-level studies have increased the understanding of employee 
InfoSec compliance and misuse behaviours, they have not paid as much attention to investigating the 
effects of organizational factors on security outcomes. 
7 Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
In this study, we explored the role of practical proficiencies in forming security culture in 
organisations. We also examined the role of supportive proficiencies, such as organisational structure 
on InfoSec practices namely prevention, detection, response and mitigation. The results of this study 
provide strong support for the influence of prevention, detection and response practices on security 
culture.  
The results of this study should be viewed in the light of its limitations. First, the cross-sectional design 
of the data collection method using a single point in time may limit the implications of the results. This 
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is because cross-sectional data does not capture organisational processes and changes and may not be 
suitable for establishing causal relationships. Second, organisational structure did not improve the 
impact of InfoSec practices on security culture. Future research should take a closer look into the 
reasons for this lack of significant moderating influence and may explore other organisational 
supportive proficiencies to better explain the reinforcement between InfoSec practice and security 
culture in organisations. 
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“The degree to which organizational structures is implemented in the organization to 
support governance of information security.” (Rocha Flores et al. 2014 p.97). 
Formal organizational structure 
• We have an organizational unit with explicit responsibility for organising and 
coordinating information security efforts as well as handling incidents. 
Coordinating organizational structure 
• There is a committee, comprised of representatives from various business units, which 
coordinates corporate security initiatives. 
• There is a committee, which deals with matters of strategic information security and 
related decision-making. 
• Tactical and operative managers are involved in information security decision-
making, which is related to their unit, responsibilities and/or subordinates. 
• In our organization, people responsible for security and representatives from various 
business units meet to discuss important security issues both formally and informally. 
Prevention Refers to protecting information assets and IS prior to an incident by prohibiting 
unauthorized access, destruction, or disclosure, and ensuring their availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity (Ahmad et al. 2014; Hamill et al. 2005; Liu et al. 2001). 
• Our security risk management strategy can be characterised as proactive. 
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• When it comes to security, our strategy focuses on prevention. 
• We hold all third-parties accountable for security. 
• We only approve third-parties/partners (irrespective of tier) that have a security risk 
management programme in place. 
• We educate employees about security practices. 
• We have a process that notifies partners across tiers if the security is threatened. 
Detection Includes measures to detect any impending or continuing attack against information or an 
IS (Hamill et al. 2005), which allows the organization to react in a targeted manner 
(Ahmad et al. 2014). 
• We use active measures such as video and sensors to be able to detect security 
breaches. 
• We use sophisticated technologies to detect if security have been compromised. 
• We monitor and synthesise information regarding security breaches. 
• We do conduct periodic assessments of our security policies, procedures. 
• We have procedures to detect security failures or near failures. 
Response “Refers to such principles and practices in organizations that are intended to react to 
information security incidents that have happened (or are happening).” (Baskerville et al. 
2014 p. 139). 
• We know what to do when we encounter security breaches or crises. 
• We have designated a group of employees as first respondents in case of a crisis. 
• There is a definite chain of command in case of a security emergency. 
• We have protocols for communication when a crisis arises. 
• We have a well-defined contingency plan to react to serious security breaches. 
• We do have a disaster recovery plan. 
• We have a specific process to reinstate operations in case of a major crisis/disruption. 
• We have strategies for recovery action after disruptions. 
Mitigation Those practices in which the organization takes some actions in advance of a disruption to 
reduce losses by lessening the impact of InfoSec breaches. (Lu et al. 2017; Tomlin 2006). 
• We cross-train our employees as a mechanism to deal with potential disruptions. 
• We have backup processes that can assist us at times of crises. 
• We have strategies to use more standard parts to reduce the risk of disruptions. 
• We developed alternative material sources in case of disruptions. 
• We simplified jobs to the extent that unskilled employee can perform a variety of them 
in case of a crisis. 
Security 
culture 
Defined as a way of doing tasks around InfoSec, including creating an environment that 
encourages and develops shared security attitudes, values, beliefs, and norms in an 
organization (Van Niekerk and Von Solms 2010). 
• Employees value the importance of security of information and computer systems. 
• In my organization, a culture exists that promotes good security and privacy practices. 
• Security (of information and systems) has traditionally been considered an important 
organizational value. 
• Practicing good security of information and systems is the accepted way of doing 
business in my organization. 
• The overall environment in my organization fosters security-minded thinking in all 
our actions. 
• Information and systems security is a key norm shared by all organizational 
members/employees. 
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